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Abstract. This paper reviews recent work on macroeconomic management with varying organ-
ization of wage/price bargaining and degrees of credible monetary conservatism. The emerging
literature synthesizes and extends theory and empirics on central bank independence (CBI) and co-
ordinated wage/price bargaining (CWB), arguing that the degrees of CBI and CWB interact with each
other and with other political-economic conditions (sectoral composition, international exposure,
etc.) to structure the incentives facing actors involved in monetary policy and wage/price bargain-
ing. The core implication, theoretically surprising but empirically supported, is that even perfectly
credible monetary conservatism has long-run, equilibrium, on-average real effects, even with fully
rational expectations, and that these effects depend on the organization of wage/price bargaining.
Conversely, wage/price-bargaining structure has real effects that depend on the degree of credible
conservatism reflected in monetary-policy rules. Each also has interactive nominal effects though
this is less surprising. Some disagreement remains over the precise nature of these interactive effects,
but all emerging theory and evidence agree that a common, credibly conservative European monetary
policy has nominal and real effects that depend on the Europe-wide institutional-structural organiza-
tion of wage/price bargaining. Indeed, the one specific piece of theoretical and empirical agreement
suggests that, for many member countries, the nominal gains from monetary-policy delegation to a
credibly conservative European Central Bank will worsen these bargaining-policy interactions.
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I. Introduction
Until recently, political economists interested in the institutional-structural determ-
inants of inflation and employment confronted two somewhat contradictory liter-
atures. One, deriving from modern game-theoretic approaches to economic policy,
stresses monetary authorities’ degrees of anti-inflationary rigor and autonomy from
governments, arguing that credibly autonomous and conservative central banks
(CBI) can achieve nominal benefits at no equilibrium, long-run real costs on
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average.1 The other, arising from studies of democratic interest intermediation,
stresses institutional organization in labor, and recently goods, markets, arguing
that coordinated wage/price-bargaining (CWB) internalizes externalities inherent
in wage/price settlements, thus facilitating restraint and thereby providing real and
perhaps nominal benefits.2
From CBI arguments and associated evidence, most academics and policy-
makers have concluded that the credible conservatism (CC) embodied in the
European Central Bank (ECB) will ensure low inflation of the common European
currency at little or no real cost. Insights from CWB work seemed only tangen-
tially relevant. Degrees of bargaining coordination (BC) in the currency area
might affect real outcomes, possibly thereby altering the nominal benefits of
the ECB; otherwise, standard CBI and CWB theories, developed independently,
suggested that their effects would be independent. Such exclusive focus on the
degree of BC or of CC3 institutionalized in the political economy no doubt aided
theoretical development in each literature, now among the most practically and
academically influential in political economy. However, wage/price bargaining and
monetary policymaking are intimately related exercises, so policymakers and bar-
gainers will likely interact strategically if their institutional structure provides the
organizational capacity to do so.
This paper reviews a new literature addressing such strategic interaction of
wage/price bargainers and monetary policymakers under varying degrees of BC
and of CC reflected in their institutional structures. Building from previous CBI and
CWB theory and empirics, this work stresses that degrees of CC and BC interact,
with each other and with other political-economic conditions (sectoral compos-
ition, international exposure, etc.), to structure the incentives facing political-
economic actors. These interactions imply that even perfectly credible monetary
conservatism has equilibrium, long-run, on-average real effects that depend on
bargaining organization, rational expectations notwithstanding. Conversely, real ef-
fects of BC depend on degrees of CC. Nominal effects are also interactive, although
this is less theoretically surprising. Intuitively: the efficacy of monetary- policy sig-
nals depends on characteristics of the sender, e.g., monetary-authorities’ credibility
and conservatism as previously emphasized, but also on those of the audience that
must receive and react to those signals, e.g., wage/price-bargaining structure. For
example, before EMU, monetary efficacy in Germany hinged on interactions of
German bargaining organizations with Bundesbank monetary policy. Analogously,
monetary efficacy in a single-currency Europe depends on interactions of ECB
monetary policymaking with European wage/price-bargaining organization. Thus,
even if the ECB obtains autonomy and conservatism equal to the Bundesbank,
its monetary-policy stance will affect the European economy differently than the
Bundesbank’s has affected the German economy because their audiences differ.
The paper develops these arguments thus. Section II briefly reviews arguments
and findings from standard, game-theoretic, classical models of monetary policy;
Section III does analogously for CWB. Each section highlights lingering issues in
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passing. Sections IV and V review emerging syntheses and extensions more fully
and summarize the supportive empirical results. Section VI concludes, stressing
implications for the likely functioning of ECB-led monetary policy in one-currency
Europe.
II. CBI: Reviewing the Standard Argument
In the 1980s and 1990s, political economists developed convincing arguments
that CBI can reduce inflation4 and, due to credibility advantages that autonomous
central banks enjoy over political authorities, that this nominal benefit had no real
costs on average (cf. note 1). In brief, given nominal and real rigidities,5 monetary
authorities have incentives to create surprise inflation to reduce real wages (prices)
and push employment (output6) above assumed-exogenous natural rates. However,
private actors realize this incentive and incorporate its inflationary consequences in
their price expectations. In rational-expectations equilibrium, monetary authorities
cannot surprise private actors systematically, so on-average real wages are unaf-
fected, employment remains at exogenously given levels, and inflation is high. If
monetary authorities could instead credibly promise to forego inflation surprises,
private actors would accept lower wages, again leaving real wages and (exogenous)
employment unaltered, but inflation could now be lower than without such credible
commitment. If, finally, institutionalizing a conservative central bank with relative
autonomy from current political authority provides credible commitment, then CBI
reduces inflation with no on-average real effects.
Notice that the model of the economy in this argument, a simple expectations-
augmented Phillips Curve, effectively assumes zero average real effects ab initio,
given unbiased expectations and exogenous monetary efficacy and natural rates.
Yet, Phillips-curve slopes and natural rates are not exogenous; they logically must
depend on wage/price-bargaining structure and how it conditions bargainers’ reac-
tions to monetary policy. With strategic private-actor reactions to monetary policy
affecting these rates and slopes, even credible monetary conservatism can have
equilibrium real-effects.
Nonetheless, many empirical studies seemed to show that CBI lowers inflation
at little or no real cost on average. Typical demonstrations (e.g., Alesina and Sum-
mers, 1993) regressed postwar averages of some nominal and real outcomes on CBI
indices in cross-sections of (usually 15–21 OECD) countries, finding significantly
negative correlations with nominal variables and insignificant correlations with real
variables. However, observations were few and so standard errors large; rarely were
appropriate (or often any) controls included; and any possibility of interactions was
ignored.7 Thus, previous results will have missed any relation between CBI and
real variables that varies with levels of other variables, such as CWB. Prominent
empirical anecdotes also seemed to bolster the case. Germany, US, and Switzer-
land have highly independent central banks and exhibited relatively low inflation
and widely differing unemployment, yet their wage/price-bargaining organizations
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also differ in ways that may explain the latter. Still, the logical argumentation,
simple but striking evidence, and prominent anecdotes obviously convinced wide
policymaking audiences as enhancing CBI rose to lead economic-reform agendas
worldwide. European leaders, e.g., clearly wrote EMU requirements and outlined
the ECB with these arguments and evidence in mind, and with the Bundesbank as
template. With theory, evidence, and anecdote seeming to suggest that monetary-
policy delegation to a credibly conservative ECB would lower inflation virtually
without real costs, it was an easy political sell.
The details of central bank behavior and pronouncements, however, are incon-
sistent with standard models. The US Federal Reserve, for example, frequently
announces (and enacts) monetary contraction to defuse “incipient inflationary pres-
sure” in strong economies. Yet, in these models, inflation temptations rise in (a)
monetary authorities’ weight on real relative to nominal outcomes, (b) Phillips-
Curve slopes, and (c) gaps between target and natural-rate output, all of which vary
counter-cyclically if at all. When economies push capacity, (a) political authorit-
ies likely fret more over inflation than output; (b) monetary-policy real-efficacy
likely shrinks (by diminishing returns); and (c) target-to-natural-rate gaps narrow
if anything (although the models assume both fixed). Thus, by this theory, strong
economies produce less “incipient inflationary pressure” on central banks.8 The
Bundesbank acts similarly, and as anomalously, although it often addresses its
announcements more directly to wage/price bargainers and governments, fairly
overtly threatening to respond with monetary contraction to pending settlements
or budgets it views as inflationary.9 Standard theory cannot explain this either.
First, the theory has no link from budget to inflation, so banks have little reason
to address governments except as public-sector price-setters and employers and
as competitors for monetary-policy control. Second, bargainers just add expected
money growth, which banks fully control, to desired real-wage growth, which they
fully control, so banks need not threaten responses, they need only to announce
fixed intended money-growth. Third, most intriguingly, the standard perspective
offers no reason that the Bundesbank should speak differently and to different
agents than does the Fed.
III. CWB: Reviewing the Standard Argument
CWB theory argued concurrently but independently that wage/price bargaining
coordination (BC) fosters beneficial real and nominal wage/price restraint.10 In
brief: fragmented bargaining units will ignore any externalities to their individual
settlements, fostering higher than optimal wage/price hikes that include increments
to offset expected increases elsewhere. Encompassing or coordinated bargaining,
contrarily, internalizes such externalities, thereby restraining settlements and so
lowering inflation and unemployment.11
Suppose, e.g., unions j set nominal wages and derive utility from their real
consumption-wages and employment prospects. Each j ’s real consumption-wage
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is its nominal wage, which it sets, less consumption prices, which it affects (via
mark-ups) in proportion to the consumption share of outputs using its labor. Thus,
j perceives greater marginal utility per nominal-wage increment the less impact
it expects its settlement to have on aggregate consumption-prices. If j ’s bargain
is encompassing or coordinated with others, it perceives aggregate prices to move
with its settlement and so little real gain from nominal hikes; conversely, if j ’s bar-
gain is small relative to the economy, it perceives aggregate prices as independent
of its settlement and so large real gains. Thus, unions perceive nominal increases
to produce real wage-gains in inverse proportion to their bargain’s share of the
economy. Against this consumption-wage benefit, which declines in BC, j weighs
the adverse employment effects of its wage gains, which increase with BC. Demand
for j ’s goods, and so its employment prospects, improve with aggregate demand
and decline in j ’s price relative to its competitors. The responses of (a) competing
goods and labor prices and (b) aggregate demand to j ’s settlements and of (c)
j ’s employment prospects to total demand all increase with j ’s bargain’s share of
the economy. If effects (b) and (c) dominate the opposite (a), which standard CWB
theory implicitly assumed, then BC increases unions’ propensity to deliver restraint
on both employment-prospect-cost and real-wage-gain sides.
Evidence also amassed to support CWB arguments (e.g., Cameron, 1984; Bruno
and Sachs, 1987). Regressions of nominal and real outcomes on various indices
of BC found negative correlations, typically stronger on the real side. Prominent
anecdotes again added convincingly; Austria and Scandinavia exhibited strong BC,
admirable unemployment, and moderate inflation. Such intuitive arguments, strik-
ing evidence, and real-world examples again combined to put raising BC on many
economic-policy agendas for a time.12
Recent theoretical advances clarify the virtually ignored employer role in
bargaining and the market-power assumptions implicit in preference orderings
assumed earlier.13 First, unions do not unilaterally set wages; rather, wage/price
settlements emerge from union-firm bargains. Thus, unions’ marginal gains from
wage increases, firms’ marginal costs from ceding them, and their respective bar-
gaining strengths must all be considered, implying that labor- and goods-market
institutional structure jointly affect wage/price regulation. This also clarifies that
monetary policy discourages inflationary settlements by shifting union-firm bar-
gaining power (e.g., by increasing unemployment) or by changing marginal utilities
from gaining or ceding nominal increases (e.g., by altering real-demand condi-
tions). Second, classic CWB theory ignored the impact of group j ’s competitive
situation on its restraint propensity. Specifically, the less competitors match price
hikes for j ’s goods caused by j ’s wage-gains, the more product-market com-
petition will bolster firms’ resolve. Likewise, the less other wage settlements
match j ’s, the more labor-market competition will foster union restraint. BC
dampens such incentives by linking wage and price increases across compet-
itors, so BC has internalization-increasing effects that foster restraint but also
competition-decreasing effects that hinder restraint.
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The combination suggests that both highly competitive and highly coordinated
bargaining can induce wage/price restraint. Under perfectly competitive labor and
goods markets, unions whose wage gains exceed productivity growth or firms
whose price hikes exceed cost increases – i.e., atomized bargaining-units j who
exercise insufficient restraint – simply lose their job or market. Perfect competition
swamps the externalities stressed in early CWB work. Under full coordination,
conversely, most relative-price concerns vanish since all domestic wages and prices
move in parallel. Incentives toward restraint stem only from the international-
competitiveness concerns stressed in the earliest literature. Between these never-
realized extremes, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that industry-level bargaining
dampens competitive-pricing considerations because most competitors are within
industry yet national-level concerns remain as small as the industry’s share of the
economy. Intermediate BC is thus inferior to both zero and full, yielding the famil-
iar Calmfors-Driffill hump. However, as others (e.g., Calmfors, 1993; Rama, 1994;
Cukierman and Lippi, 1999; Velasco and Guzzo, 1999) have noted, the shape of
relationships between BC and restraint depends critically on relative-wage and -
price elasticities and how BC alters them. Unfortunately, the syntheses reviewed
below inherit this indeterminacy.
Other controversies also plague further theoretical and empirical progress:
(a) the actual degree of BC characterizing certain country-times,14 (b) how well
union membership-structure may proxy for effective BC,15 and (c) the exact
shape of the Calmfors-Driffill hump. Even if BC relates curvilinearly to restraint
with most at zero and full BC, whether restraint falls quickly and rises gradu-
ally as BC increases, vice versa, or otherwise remains theoretically ambiguous,
and issues (a) and (b) will hamper empirical adjudication. Worse, even with all
three issues resolved, the ranges of BC in any given sample relative to theor-
etical zero and full BC, and so the section of the hump empirically revealed,
would remain unknown.16 If restraint falls quickly and rises gradually in BC,
e.g., the sample could easily lie entirely right of nadir, so estimates would in-
dicate restraint rises monotonically in BC. Current theory can only recommend
that empirical measures consider economy-wide BC across unions and firms17 and
that the estimated BC-restraint relations allow for both competition-reducing and
internalization-increasing effects.18 Finally, while classic CBI theory precluded
strategic interactions of bargaining and monetary policy by assuming Philips-
Curve slopes and natural rates exogenous even though they logically intertwine,
classic CWB theory precluded interactive considerations by (implicitly) assuming
accommodating or passive policy even though autonomous, conservative central
banks will certainly react to inflationary settlements. Furthermore, classic CWB
theory often assumed homogenous unions and firms, yet interests logically differ,
in general and vis-à-vis monetary policy, across sectors.
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IV. Reviewing the Emerging Theoretical Syntheses and Extensions
In sum, CBI theory predicts centrally that CC yields low inflation at zero average
real cost; empirics seemed supportive. The theory, however, predicts more than
has been explored theoretically or empirically; monetary authorities’ actions and
announcements contradict these more detailed predictions; and private actors have
been under-specified and, particularly, assumed non-strategic. CWB theory, con-
versely, predicts that BC fosters nominal and real wage/price restraint, perhaps
curvilinearly, and empirics seemed supportive. Recent advances clarify some issues
but also raise empirical and theoretical controversies and still ignore monetary-
policy reactions to wage/price settlements19 and possible differential interests
among bargainers. Both literatures offered valuable insights, but their juxtaposition
reveals incompatibilities and inadequacies. CBI assumes direct monetary control of
inflation and exogenous natural rates and monetary efficacy, yet bargaining implies
market power, suggesting bargainers may interact strategically with monetary au-
thorities, which could invalidate all three assumptions. Conversely, CWB assumes
monetary policy accommodates or ignores wage/price bargains, yet whoever con-
trols monetary policy must respond to these settlements, again suggesting strategic
interaction. The emerging syntheses and extensions begin to address these issues,
finding that the institutional-structural organization of the bargainers with which
the monetary authorities interact is central to their joint efficacy in regulating both
nominal and real outcomes, so, e.g., the nominal and real effects of ECB hinge
critically on the organization of European wage/price bargaining.
Several approaches to redressing these contradictions and synthesizing and ex-
tending CBI and CWB insights have been offered. One retains strict real-nominal
divides by assumption yet shows the nominal effects of CC and BC to depend
on each other (and on many other political-economic conditions); a second shows
that such nominal effects alone suffice to produce equilibrium real effects of CC if
other actors, e.g., governments, can affect real and care about nominal outcomes. A
third shows that strategic, monopolistic bargainers suffice to produce non-neutrality
of non-strategic monetary rules. A fourth studies interactions between strategic
monetary authorities and strategic, monopolistic, inflation-averse bargainers, also
implying interactive real and nominal effects for CC. A fifth stresses differences
among as well as coordination across strategic bargainers; there, real effects of CC
depend on BC and on heterogeneity among bargaining units.
To presage, all these approaches, classic CBI theory included, imply that the
nominal effects of CC depend on the institutions and structure of labor/goods
markets. The second approach shows that this suffices to imply interactive real
effects of CC because governments’ incentives to undertake real reform depend
partly on its potential to lower inflation, which depends on the CC of the central
bank. EMU, e.g., alters member nations’ incentives to undertake politically costly
real reform intended to reduce inflation bias. Other approaches go further, con-
cluding: if private actors have sufficient market power to interact strategically with
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monetary authorities, then the CC embodied in monetary institutions affects both
nominal and real variables on average, in equilibrium, even with fully rational
expectations, and beyond any changes in other policy instruments that such CC
may induce. These approaches agree that CC has real effects because it alters
relationships between bargaining organization and wage/price restraint, but sharp
disagreement remains, largely inherited from the indeterminacy of CWB theory,
on the signs and shapes of these relationships and on how the degree of CC alters
them. These disagreements will unfortunately debar shared predictions much more
specific than that the real effects of the ECB’s CC will depend on the degree of BC
exhibited at the European level. Still, one specific conclusion that is shared will
suggest that, for many countries, monetary delegation to a conservative ECB will
worsen the interaction of monetary policy and wage/price bargaining.
4.1. RETAINING THE STRICT, CLASSICAL NOMINAL-REAL DIVIDE
The first approach retains nominal-real divides by assumption and distinguishes
the conservatism of the monetary authorities (c) from the autonomy of central
bank from political authority (CBA). Franzese (1999b) elaborates the general case,
which shows the nominal effects ofCBA to depend on the institutions and structure
of bargaining (and many other political-economic factors), and shows the evidence
strongly supportive.20 The logic is simple; virtually by definition of autonomy, the
bank controls monetary policy to the degree given by CBA and the government
controls it to the remaining degree, giving:21
m∗ = CBA ·m∗b + (1 − CBA) ·m∗g
m∗b = πTb +
α
cb
(yTb − yn) (1)




with money growth m, inflation π , a real variable y, Philips–Curve slope α,
monetary-authority conservatism c, and b referring to banks, g governments, n
natural rates, ∗ equilibria, and T targets. Lines two and three are just equilibrium
money-growth in the classic CBI model. Line one shows that, even excluding any
strategic interactions between monetary authorities and other actors and retaining
direct policymaker control of inflation (i.e., assuming m ≡ π ), the nominal effect
ofCBA depends on everything that differentially impacts banks’ and governments’
desired policies and, vice versa, any such factors’ nominal effects depend on CBA:
dπ
dCBA
= −(m∗g −m∗b) = −[(πTg − πTb )+ α{(yTg − yn)/cg − (yTb − yn)/cb}]. (2)
Thus, since BC affects yn and α, the nominal effects of CBA and BC depend
on each other (and on anything else that impacts πTg , π
T




b , α, or yn).
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Note that inflationary biases in the classic model only exist insofar as targets exceed
natural rates, yT > yn. Thus, since yn decreases in real-wage excessiveness, which
rises in labor/goods institutional structures that lessen competition (e.g., mono-
poly power) but declines in those that enhance internalization (e.g., coordination),
adding CWB logic directly to standard CBI theory yields:
(a) Bargaining coordination (monopoly power) reduces (increases) natural rates;
(b) CBA reduces inflation, less (more) so the higher is bargaining coordination
(monopoly power);
(c) Bargaining coordination (monopoly power) reduces (increases) inflation, less
so the higher CBA;
(d) CBA does not affect natural rates on average (by assumption).
Note that CC has two parts: central bank autonomy (CBA) and conservatism
relative to government (cb−cg); the beneficial nominal effects of each increase (de-
crease) in the monopoly power (coordination) of bargainers. Moreover, the effects
of bargaining institutions on the natural rate, yn, and monetary efficacy, α, may
also depend on monetary credibility and conservatism due to strategic interaction
effects (see below).22 Even without such strategic interactions, though, a simple
additive combination of CBI and CWB logic implies that the ECB’s nominal ef-
fects will depend on many factors that would affect the desired policies of the
ECB and of European political authorities differently, including the organization
of bargaining in Europe.
As noted, these nominal effects alone can induce other policy changes with
equilibrium real effects. E.g., since autonomous, conservative central banks re-
duce the inflation cost of inferior labor/goods-market organization, delegation to
the ECB will reduce member-government incentives to undertake economically
beneficial but politically costly reforms. Thus, a conservative ECB has real costs
directly proportional to its nominal benefits (Ozkan et al., 1998). Likewise, all
Euro members will receive the nominal benefits of any one’s reforms, so mutual
delegation to the ECB creates classic externalities with under-investment in reform
(Calmfors, 1998). If, contrarily, exchange-rate policy substituted for labor/goods-
market nominal-flexibility, then common-currency commitments will increase the
value of pro-flexibility reforms (Sibert and Sutherland, 1998). Alternatively, if un-
der EMU, members whose inferior labor/goods-market institutions raised inflation
temptations received side-payments to ignore them, this would have generated in-
centives to under-invest in reform that would disappear with the side-payments
when these members delegate monetary control to the ECB (Sibert, 1999).23 Thus,
in political-economic general equilibria where governments react strategically to
monetary authorities, the real effects of the ECB’s CC are non-zero and correlate,
positively or negatively, with its nominal effects, which, in turn, depend on BC in
and across member countries (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1a. Illustration of the theories and predictions from the reviewed work.
4.2. ADDING STRATEGIC WAGE/PRICE BARGAINERS
The above approaches continue to debar strategic interactions between wage/price
bargainers and monetary authorities, but, if such interactions alter yn and α, syn-
theses that maintain such strict real-nominal divides will not suffice. Soskice and
Iversen (1998, 1999) show that strategic bargainers with monopolistic power in-
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Figure 1b.
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Figure 1c.
duce equilibrium, long-run, on-average real effects for CC.24 Non-neutrality stems
from bargainers’ collective-action problems, not from any lack of credibility, so
they model money supply as fully known to follow M = P 1−β with aggregate
price P ≡ ni=1(P n−1i ). β ∈ [0 . . . 1] indexes monetary conservatism: β = 0
(β = 1) ⇔ full (non-)accommodation. Next, n equal-sized unions with perfect
sectoral monopolies Bertrand compete under constant scale-returns and fixed labor
productivity of one, which implies good i’s price equals sector i’s wage: Pi = Wi .
Lastly, they assume real demand for i equal to its employment, qi = ei , and given
by:
qi = ei = m
n
− ηpi = m
n
− ηw3i (3)
with real money-supply m, relative price pi ≡ Pi/P , and relative-price demand-
elasticity η. Sectoral-monopoly unions set Wi to maximize weighted products of
their real consumption-wages, ωi, and their sector’s employment, ei , with weight









Thus, unless n = ∞ (i.e., outside perfect competition), monetary conservatism,
β, has real rational-expectations-equilibrium effects, which vary with the number
of unions, n.25 Specifically, conservatism (higher β) raises employment and does so
increasingly as BC rises (n falls) from perfect competition, n = ∞, with zero real
effects, to n = 1, where the equilibrium is undefined (see Figure 1). Intuitively,
when n is low, each large bargaining unit perceives its nominal gain to produce
aggregate real-money-supply contraction, and more so the less accommodating
the monetary authority (i.e., the higher β). Encompassing bargaining thus induces
more restraint as conservatism, β, increases. As n becomes large, however, this
effect vanishes because real money supply becomes increasingly exogenous to the
extremely atomized bargainers.
The Soskice-Iversen models thus conclude that CC has beneficial real effects
that increase with BC. Classic CBI theory missed this by ignoring the real money
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supply’s dependence on wage/price decisions, d(M/P)
dWi
= β
n−1 , which is non-zero
and declines in n for n < ∞. By this analysis, highly conservative monetary rules
(high β) interact best with highly coordinated bargaining systems (low n) such as
in Germany under the Bundesbank and IG Metal-Gesamptmetal-led bargaining.
The ECB conducting similarly conservative policy, however, would face a far less
coordinated European bargaining system (higher n), and so would have less be-
neficial real effect. Soskice and Iversen (1998) stress, however, that the European
bargaining system to which the ECB must respond is as yet undetermined. They
suggest that Europe could evolve a system wherein lead-bargains in one country set
wage-increase precedents that the rest follow. The ECB could then interact more
directly with the pattern-setter: a more beneficial arrangement.
Two aspects of the Soskice–Iversen approach differentiate it, and its conclu-
sions, from those below. First, monetary policy here is non-strategic; the exogenous
money-supply rules do not derive from optimal policymaker responses to bargain-
ing settlements. Such strategic interactions are more likely bi-directional. Second,
they assume relative-wage demand-elasticity, η, exogenously fixed and, critic-
ally, independent of n, yet, as the number of sectors encompassed in a single
wage/price-bargain rises, relative-wage elasticity likely diminishes.26 No such
Calmfors–Driffill competition effect operates here, so they find BC monotonically
increasingly beneficial in CC. These differences plus bargainer inflation-aversion
led others to markedly different conclusions about CC’s real effects.27 Nonetheless,
their core intuition is widely shared: strategic bargainers facing monetary-policy
rules (reaction functions elsewhere) perceive an ability to affect real money supply
in proportion to their share of the economy and the monetary rule’s conservatism.
Thus, all agree the real effects of CC are generally non-zero and dependent on (and
generally improving in) BC.
4.3.1. ADDING A MONOPOLY, STRATEGIC, INFLATION-AVERSE WAGE/PRICE
BARGAINER
Several others28 explore interactions of a strategic monetary authority with one
strategic monopoly bargainer. In these models, CC has equilibrium real effects if
the wage/price bargainer is inflation-averse. Empirically, private-actor inflation-
aversion is quite large and well-documented (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1987, ch. 4); theor-
etically, inflation-aversion can be justified on four grounds. First, monetary-policy
models routinely assume inflation-averse policymakers, so symmetry demands
private-actor inflation-aversion. Moreover, any actual government’s utility must
derive from some combination of private-actor’s utilities, albeit likely with quite
unequal weight especially in non-democracies; so, if policymakers dislike in-
flation, some private actors must also.29 Any reason adduced for policymaker
inflation-aversion (e.g., correlation of inflation levels and volatility) therefore also
justifies private-actor aversion. Second, inflation-aversion is standard, if often
under-motivated, in CWB theory. Possible motivations include, third, private-
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actor holdings of non-fully indexed nominal assets, especially mandatory ones
like some tax systems or pension schemes. Last, domestic inflation is a relat-
ive price-rise in any open economy unless domestic consumption and production
bundles are equal (i.e., given trade).30 Regardless of theoretical motivation, a stra-
tegic inflation-averse bargainer will consider monetary-policy reactions to their
behavior, including the inflation-effects of such reactions, in its bargaining.
Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), e.g., start with the quantity theory, Y + P =
M + V , setting V = 0, as “. . . the simplest possible way to capture the crucial
inverse relationship between output and the price level for given money supply.”
They add Y = P − W as “. . . the simplest possible aggregate supply as an in-
creasing function of price for given nominal wage,” and set all elasticities to one
for simplicity. Aggregate equilibrium (AD = AS) then implies: Y = 0.5(M −W);
P = 0.5(M+W). If government and monopoly union exogenously dictated money










Cournot-Nash equilibra are more novel. Subject to AD = AS, strategic govern-
ments minimize over M losses quadratic in output and inflation deviations from
targets, as standard, and the strategic monopoly-union minimizes over W losses
quadratic in real-wage, output, and inflation deviations from targets, also standard
but adding inflation-aversion. This gives reaction functions32 wherein the union
fully accommodates money increases, so real-nominal divides obtain, only if it
disregards inflation and government fully accommodates wage increases, leaving
the union unable to affect output, only if it disregards inflation. Each accommod-
ates less the more it weighs inflation. Generally, output and prices depend on all
preference parameters of both parties; but, if union and government targets, Y T and
#PT , are equal, further insights emerge. If the union’s real-wage and employment
targets lie above the labor-demand curve at full employment, union-government
strategic interactions spawn stagflation: Y < YT and #P > #PT . If union targets
lie on the curve, government conservatism, #PTg < #P
T
u , alone will imply stagfla-
tion. Only if monopoly union and monetary authority target equal employment and
inflation and the union’s target real-wage/employment combination is not above
labor demand, is CC neutral nominally and really. If either is violated, CC has
equilibrium real and nominal effects that depend critically on the preferences and
targets of both the monopoly union and the government.33
One common, surprising result of this approach is that ultra-liberal monetary
authorities, those indifferent to inflation, may achieve optimal (zero inflation and
unemployment) outcomes. Skott (1997) nicely summarizes the intuition behind
this and the related results:
. . . If the central bank is inflation averse (or committed to a particular inflation
rate or growth of nominal demand), the union can take advantage of this aver-
sion (pre-commitment): high money-wage increases will buy lower output
(and raise real wages). Whether and to what extent the union will want to
exploit this possibility depends on the terms at which it can purchase output
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changes (i.e., the central bank’s [relative weights on inflation and output])
as well as on its own relative preferences for inflation and output . . . At one
extreme . . . the inflation-indifferent central bank . . . makes it infinitely expens-
ive for the union to reduce output [below the bank’s target], y∗∗; at the other
extreme, the output-indifferent central bank implies that it is costless for the
union to reduce output, so the union achieves its bliss point, y∗. Between those
extremes are outcomes with π > 0 and y∗∗ > y > y∗ (p. 613).
Grüner and Hefeker (1997) and Zervoyianni (1997) analyze exchange-rate com-
mitments and international exposure, respectively, assuming an inflation-averse
monopoly union in each of two countries and monetary policy set by vari-
ous combinations of the governments. They conclude, inter alia, that domestic
monetary-policy credible-conservatism is not functionally equivalent to exchange-
rate schemes because the set of wage/price-bargainers with which the relevant
monetary policymakers interact differs.34 Similar insights drive this review’s
application of the emerging syntheses to ECB-led European monetary policy.
Single-bargainer models, however, are ill-suited to such analysis because bargain-
ing structure cannot be varied and member-country delegations to the ECB neither
start from nor end in monopoly-union settings.
4.3.2. ADDING VARYINGLY ORGANIZED, STRATEGIC, INFLATION-AVERSE
WAGE/PRICE BARGAINERS
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) and Velasco and Guzzo (1999) allow union concen-
tration to vary. The former consider n unions and a monetary policymaker with
utilities similar to 4.3.1. They assume all labor is unionized by craft, so that labor
is perfectly substitutable across industries but imperfectly across unions. They
allow higher centralization (lower n) to reduce labor-demand elasticity to reflect
Calmfors–Driffill’s competition effect, but fix substitutability across crafts, γ . Each
union sets its nominal wages, taking others’ and the bank’s reaction function as
given; the bank fulfills its reaction function (fully credible commitment), setting





ϕ; ϕ ≡ ' − ωc (5)
u = αϕ; ϕ ≡ ' − ωc (6)
π ≡ inflation; u ≡ unemployment; ωc ≡ market-clearing real-wage. The key term,
ϕ, is the average real-wage premium. c is the bank’s weight on nominal relative to
real targets (CC), and α plays a similar role to the Phillips Curve slope. This would
be exactly the classic CBI result, except that ϕ depends on c.
This strategic non-neutrality arises for two reasons. First, because unions dislike
inflation, which the bank will increase in response to higher unemployment, unions
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may moderate their wage demands to lessen that temptation. The larger its share
of the economy, the more union j perceives bank responses directly, so the more
it moderates. Conversely, the more conservative the bank (higher c), the less j
expects it to succumb to such temptations, so the less this restraint-inducing mech-
anism, which drove results in 4.3.1 also, operates. Second, the model also reveals
a competition-induced strategic non-neutrality (CISNN), which arises because the
marginal real-wage effect j perceives from higher nominal wages increases in c
while the relative-wage effect perceived is independent of c. Higher c narrows this
differential and thus alters unions’ CISNN-induced moderation. A similar mech-
anism seems to drive the Soskice–Iversen results. However, the direction of CC’s
effect on the CISNN depends heavily on elasticity assumptions, regarding α and
γ , and their relation to n.35
Equilibrium nominal and real outcomes depend on c and n−1 (CC and BC) and
their interaction, but highly non-linearly, complicating interpretation. Cukierman–
Lippi manage several propositions. (1) Higher union inflation-aversion, B, and
cross-craft substitutability, φ, lower unemployment and inflation, though these
effects vanish at n = ∞ (perfect competition). (2) Beyond a critical amount of
inflation-aversion relative to other terms, Bc = Ac2γ /α3, a Calmfors–Driffill curve
relates n−1 (BC) to real-wage premia, ϕ; short of Bc, real and nominal outcomes
strictly worsen in BC (competition effects dominate). (3) If inflation-aversion ex-
ceeds Bc, the Calmfors–Driffill curve adverse peak shifts toward decentralization
as c rises (see Figure 1); (4) n = ∞ always dominates n = 1. The net of these
interactive effects determine if Calmfors–Driffill curves exist – BC monotonically
raises real-wage premia if not – and how CC-BC interactions shift and reshape that
relation.
The comparative statics of core interest are as follows. If labor is incompletely
substitutable and n > 1 (i.e., outside perfect competition) or if unions are inflation
averse, CC unambiguously reduces employment. (CC also generally lowers infla-
tion, but sufficient inflation aversion can even upend that at some n.) Visually,
in BC-unemployment space, Calmfors–Driffill curves at higher CC lie entirely
above those at lower CC, and peaks accentuate and drift toward lower BC as
CC rises (see Figure 1). Unemployment peaks at intermediate BC with sufficient
inflation-aversion but strictly rises in BC at less. Broadly, then, relations between
BC and real outcomes depend on degrees of CC, but the nature of this shifting and
reshaping of Calmfors–Driffill curves hinges critically on assumptions regarding
substitution elasticities across labor and goods types (and other parameters) and
how BC alters those elasticities. For these purposes, suffice to note that CC gen-
erally reduces employment, generally more at low-to-mid BC than at mid-to-high
BC, although these effects fade at BC extremes. Thus, Cukierman–Lippi suggests
that CC interacts best with mid-to-highly coordinated bargainers, producing low
inflation at low, but positive, real costs. Monetary conservatism from the ECB,
contrarily, likely achieves low inflation only at relatively high real cost because
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European labor and goods markets include many poorly coordinated bargaining
units, each retaining appreciable monopoly power.
Other model aspects warrant further development. First, European labor or-
ganizes more by industry or sector than by craft, so the craft-union assumption
likely overemphasizes inter-union relative to inter-firm substitution. Second, as
in Soskice–Iversen, only labor-demand real-wage-elasticity depends on n, so
BC has no competition-reducing effects here either, but, unlike Soskice–Iversen,
inflation-aversion may reproduce a Calmfors–Driffill hump here even though labor-
demand relative-wage-elasticity remains exogenous to n, submerging the hump’s
original source. Analyzing a Cukierman–Lippi model without inflation-aversion
and Soskice–Iversen with strategic monetary policy may help clarify the CISNN.
Finally, employers (and governments) are largely absent in all these models. Uni-
ons set wages and firms take them; the only bargains are between unions and central
banks, each of whom fully controls its instrument: wages and money supply.
Velasco and Guzzo (1999) offer a model with a representative firm employ-
ing a continuum of labor types to produce a single good, endogenizing more
key parameters. Profit maximization produces symmetric labor demand for each
labor-type. Equal-sized unions maximize workers’ intertemporal utilities, which
weigh consumption against labor and inflation. The strong symmetry implies uni-
ons optimally set equal wages for all workers. Otherwise, the model resembles
Cukierman–Lippi. Real-wage labor-demand elasticity for each worker as the union
perceives it is again central. It again depends positively on the number of unions,
n, and on substitution elasticity between worker-types, σ , and returns-to-scale, α,
though now via the firm’s production function and profit-maximization decision
in general equilibrium. Bertrand games among unions and between each union
and the monetary authority, with unions setting wages first, the authority setting
inflation next, and the firm setting employment and output last, produce several
startling results.
First, outside perfect competition, strategic inflation-averse unions moderate
wage demands to reduce policymakers’ inflation temptations, more so the less
conservative the monetary authority. This mechanism operates as in all inflation-
averse-bargainers models to imply CC reduces restraint and employment. Second,
however, the CISNN operates very differently than in Cukierman–Lippi, wherein,
given sufficient inflation-aversion relative to labor-demand real-wage-elasticity, a
Calmfors-Driffill curve emerges that shifts up and peaks further left as CC in-
creases. In Velasco–Guzzo, CC also shifts BC-unemployment relations upward,
but a standard Calmfors–Driffill hump never emerges. Rather, if substitution elasti-
city across worker types is low enough, employment monotonically falls (rises) in
n (BC); employment peaks at intermediate BC otherwise: an inverse Calmfors–
Driffill curve (see Figure 1). These differences arise from the high symmetry in
Velasco–Guzzo, which, by inducing equal equilibrium wages, flattens Calmfors–
Driffill curves. Also, Velasco–Guzzo allows competition-effects to increase as n
rises, but toward a fixed parameter of the production function rather than toward
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infinity as in Cukierman–Lippi and Calmfors–Driffill. Thus, as n → ∞, BC’s
competition-reducing effects remain limited in Velasco–Guzzo whereas they be-
come infinite in other models; so, again, the crucial parametric assumptions regard
labor substitutability across unions, σ , and its relation to BC.
Despite these differences, Velasco–Guzzo also finds nominal and CC and BC
real effects interactive, highly non-linear, and dependent on key parameter values.
They graph several simulations that illustrate the core comparative statics (see
Figure 1). In this model, CC always has positive real costs, R, which depend
on substitution elasticity of worker types, σ , scale returns, α, BC, and CC itself:
dR
dCC
= f (σ , BC, CC) > 0. CC generally has diminishing marginal real costs:
d2R
dCC2
< 0. With σ (1 − α) < 1, dR
dCC
also diminishes in BC; with σ (1 − α) > 1,
BC raises dR
dCC
but only noticeably so for n < 3±. Thus, d2R
dCCdn−1 ≡ dfdn−1 <> 0
as σ (1 − α) <> 1. This last indeterminacy notwithstanding, the model’s implic-
ations for a move toward common, conservative European monetary policy are
one-sided. For most members, the move effectively decentralizes bargaining, but,
even if σ (1 − α) > 1, so that the lower BC would reduce the real costs of ECB
conservatism, Europe would be in the flat range of that curve (n > 3). If, contrar-
ily, σ (1 − α) < 1, the bargaining decentralization induced by raising monetary
policy to the European level would increase the real costs of ECB conservatism
appreciably.
4.4. ADDING STRATEGIC, DIFFERENTIATED BARGAINERS
Two last approaches emphasize differences among strategic bargainers additionally
to their degree of coordination. Franzese (1999a) stresses the different impact of
CC on traded, non-traded, and public-sectors. Iversen (1998a, b) stresses strategic
unions that dislike wage disparity in addition to standard real-wage and employ-
ment goals, underscoring differences in productivity (growth) across and among
bargaining units.36
Franzese (1999a) argues that, since monetary policymakers do not directly con-
trol prices, they must control inflation via monetary- policy responses to wage/price
bargains sufficient to induce non- inflationary settlements from monopolistic bar-
gainers. Policymakers essentially announce threats, dM
dP
, that shift power-balances
in union-firm Nash bargains toward acceptable nominal growth. As elsewhere, the
threats required to induce non-inflationary settlements become less severe as BC
rises because bargainers perceive only n−1 of threats directly. He also stresses,
though, that monetary policy impacts heterogeneous bargainers differently. En-
acted threats (real contractions) hinder domestic real-demand and so injure all
actors dependent thereupon, including all private-sector but excluding public-
sector bargainers. Monetary contractions also raise export relative to import prices,
thereby especially injuring traded-sector bargainers. Because policymakers induce
restraint by creating or threatening real slack sufficient to induce non- inflation-
ary settlements, the rest of the economy must suffer disproportionately less when
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traded-, more when public-, and intermediately when non-traded-sector bargainers
dominate the aggregate of wage/price settlements. If, as he argues, policymakers
must occasionally enact threats, then monetary conservatism offers nominal bene-
fits only at some real cost. The terms of this familiar tradeoff generally improve
with BC and are best (worst, intermediate) when traded- (public-, non-traded-)
sector bargainers lead (see Figure 1).37 However, for any given degree of conser-
vatism, greater credibility remains unambiguously beneficial because it reduces
required degrees of threat enactment.
CC, BC, and traded-relative-to-public-sector-dominance thus complement in
producing real benefits but substitute (see (1)) in producing nominal benefits.
The argument suggests that the strong nominal and real performance of postwar
Germany derived partly from especially beneficial interactions between its high-
CC Bundesbank and its moderately high-BC led by IG Metall and Gesamptmetall
(traded-sector confederations). ECB European monetary policy, contrarily, faces
lower European BC with relatively weaker traded- and stronger public-sectors,
a less beneficial arrangement. As Soskice-Iversen conclude also, some pattern-
setting among member-countries’ bargaining organizations might improve matters,
here especially if traded-sector bargainers lead as in Germany. Franzese (1999a),
however, merely describes marginal (dis-)utilities to unions (firms) of nominal
increases given dP
dWj
, which depend on BC, and threat schedules dM
dP
, which de-
pend on CC, to illustrate and guide the argument. Distinguishing conservatism
from credibility, modeling union-firm bargaining directly, and allowing differen-
tiated bargainers strategic relation to policymakers all seem to promise important
advances, but full formal implementation in a closed equilibrium model remains.
Iversen (1998a, b) also studies differences among bargainers but stresses stra-
tegic unions that, beyond standard real-wage and employment goals, dislike wage
disparity. Highly centralized bargaining compresses the nominal-wage distribu-
tion, which induces wage creep wherein high-skill and other market-empowered
workers wring supplementary raises from employers, which requires lax monetary
policy to accommodate and to erode the implied real-wage disparity. Aggregate
real efficiency will require more such nominal laxity as the wages of more-
disparate-productivity workers are compressed within encompassed bargaining
units. In this context, monetary conservatism will have adverse real effects at
very-high BC. At perfect competition, contrarily, marginal-value productivity, not
bargaining, determines wages and disparity, so CC is neutral. At intermediate cent-
ralization, bargains allow wage-disparity to reflect productivity differentials, and
monetary conservatism is actually required to enforce cooperative lead-bargain
coordination on aggregate restraint.38
Again, CC has equilibrium real effects that depend on BC and, here, also
on productivity (growth) differences in and across bargaining units (see Figure
1). The model, however, seems to rely on differential money illusion among
bargainers as high-productivity-growth workers tolerate the erosion of their rel-
ative gains from wage creep. Also under-explicated is why centralized settlements
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cannot include productivity-scheduled deviations from restrained average wage-
increases.39 Still, the model clearly illustrates preference differences across low-
and high-productivity-growth workers, both intrinsically and vis-à-vis their stra-
tegic interaction with monetary authorities,40 and its substantive implications are
clear. Pattern-setting in European bargaining would be optimal, nominally and
really; very-high coordination is undesirable; and deregulatory moves might be
beneficial if very large but would still be dominated by moderate coordination by
pattern setting. However, the ECB’s impact would also depend on how disparate
the productivity growth of those in any European lead-bargaining scheme. The
radically different productivity levels and growth rates across Europe may make
an appropriate balance between the benefits of pattern-setting BC and the costs
of wage compression without nominal laxity difficult. Unfortunately, the historical
parallel may be absorption of the East into the West German bargaining system,
rather than the postwar success of the West German system.
V. The Accumulating Empirical Support
Rapidly amassing evidence supports many of these claims. Hall (1994) first charted
postwar-average inflation and unemployment by CC and BC,41 revealing an in-
teractive pattern. Hall and Franzese (1998) show that pattern tabularly, finding
postwar-average (a) inflation falls in CC and in BC and (b) unemployment falls
in BC and rises in CC. (c) The unemployment fall per unit BC (rise per unit
CC) is larger (smaller) at higher CC (BC), suggesting a real complementarity. (d)
The inflation reduction per unit CC and BC each diminishes as the other rises,
suggesting a nominal substitutability. Their regression analyses, using postwar-
average, decade,42 and annual data in 18 OECD countries 1950-90, reinforce these
conclusions (but (d) only weakly).
Franzese (1994, 1996, ch. 4) explored interactive real effects of CC, BC, and
sectoral structure in decade data from 21 OECD countries. Beyond CC-BC inter-
actions (results consistent with and statistically stronger than Hall and Franzese
(1998)), he included traded-sector and government employment-shares and their
interactions with CC. Strong evidence of detrimental public-employment and CC
interactions emerged. At high (low) CC, higher public employment-shares spurred
(reduced) unemployment; also, though less strongly statistically, traded-sector
employment-share improved unemployment outcomes, more so the greater CC.
Garrett and Way (1995a) criticize the use of subjective indices of BC in these
studies. Replacing BC with union strength (union concentration plus coverage
rates), a procedure others (e.g., Swenson, 1989; Soskice, 1990) argue against, they
nonetheless find similar institutional interactions as in Hall and Franzese (1998).
In postwar quinquennial data from 13 OECD countries, they find evidence of be-
neficial CC and BC interactions in regulating inflation (weakly), unemployment
(moderately), and real-growth (strongly).
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Garrett and Way (1995b) give evidence, more-direct than in Franzese (1994), of
the deleterious effect of public-sector weight within bargaining on BC propensity
to deliver wage/price restraint. They estimate a curvilinear relation between union
strength and unemployment, allowing public-sector strength within unions (public-
sector share of total members) to alter that relation. In quinquennial data from
13 OECD countries, they find a standard Calmfors–Driffill hump between union
strength and unemployment at low public-sector strength, but that union strength
becomes increasingly a monotonic real detriment as public- sector strength rises.
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) regress unemployment and inflation averages in
1978–82, 1988–92, and 1992–96 in 19 OECD countries on (a) high, medium, low
BC dummies (from OECD 1997); (b) Cukierman’s (1992) LVAU index of CC; and
interactions of (b) with (a). At low BC, they find CC raises unemployment as they
predict, but CC reduces unemployment at intermediate BC and also, insignificantly
slightly less so, at high BC, contrary to their predictions.43 Their inflation findings
are similarly mixed. Still, the Cukierman–Lippi results agree with previous findings
and their arguments in that dR
dCC




negative. I.e., CC has real costs at low BC, and these costs decline as BC increases,
here becoming benefits.
Iversen (1998a, b) also find real effects for CC that depend on BC and vice
versa. He argues, and finds in quinquennial 1973–93 data in 15 OECD countries,
that CC reduces unemployment at moderate bargaining concentration, increases
it at high, and has little effect at low. His sample and measurement of CC44 and
BC45 all differ from others’, so the differences are less surprising. Disturbingly,
though, his results imply CC has real benefits over most of BC’s sample-range, and
real costs only at very high BC whereas others argue and find almost oppositely.
Franzese (1999a) offers arguments and evidence that may resolve these differences
(see below), but note here the continuing agreement that going from low to mid
BC reduces real costs (raises real benefits) of CC. I.e., Iversen too finds that dR
dCC
slopes downward from low to moderately high BC.
Franzese (1999a) considers real and nominal outcomes in yearly 1974–90 data
in 21 OECD countries, relating them to CC, BC, G/T, and (G/T)2, where G is
government- and T is traded-sector employment-share. He finds that BC is more
beneficial in real and nominal terms the more traded sectors dominate government
sectors in bargaining; indeed, BC becomes detrimental with sufficient government-
sector dominance. CC has nominal benefits that diminish as traded-sector-led BC
rises and increase as BC falls or becomes increasingly public-sector led. CC has
real costs that diminish as traded-sector-led BC rises but that rise as public-sectors
increasingly lead or BC falls. I.e., the impact of BC, both per se and in strategic
interaction with CC, depends critically on the competitive exposure of the bargain-
ers being coordinated, and, specifically, CC and traded-sector-led BC are strategic
complements (substitutes) in determining real (nominal) outcomes.
Iversen (1998a, b) find real costs of CC at very high, benefits at moderate,
and little effect at low BC; Cukierman and Lippi (1999) find real benefits at
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mid, slightly lesser at high, and real costs at low BC. Others find real costs of
CC that monotonically diminish in BC, although their specifications do not al-
low non-linear interactions. Franzese (1999a) suggests a reconciliation. He argues
and finds CC interacts detrimentally with high public-sector-led BC and notes
that the adverse sign of dR
dCC
predicted by Iversen at high BC requires that work-
ers of highly disparate productivity (growth) accede to common settlements. As
traded-and-government-sector and high-and-low-productivity-growth workers are
empirically much the same sets, this could explain the findings if this particular
sectoral composition tends to occur at high BC. Franzese argues that, if high BC
induces wage-compression, it would tend to price private sectors out of, and so
public sectors into, the service sector, where much employment growth has oc-
curred. Thus, the requisite composition will likely evolve at high BC. Because
it does not always, and because some high-BC systems allow appreciable wage
disparity (Austria), this could also explain the less-significantly beneficial CC-BC
interaction Cukierman-Lippi find at high BC.
Such dispute notwithstanding, all the empirical work agrees on three core
results. First, all find non-zero long-run, equilibrium, on-average real effects for
CC. Money may be neutral, but the expected character of monetary policy, i.e.
conservatism, is not. Second, all find wage/price-bargaining institutional-structural
organization and the nature of monetary policymaking interact to determine both
nominal and real outcomes. CC’s effects depend on BC and v.v. Third, all find
the real effects of CC less unpalatable or more palatable with mid-to-high BC
than with low-to-mid BC; i.e., all find dR
dCC




the empirically intermediate BC-range. Discord regards the real effect of CC at
high BC and the exact shape of dR
dCC
; i.e., whether this generally agreed non-zero
and downward-sloping effect line lies above or below zero and at what level of
BC it may cross. Nominal effects are also broadly agreed; CC reduces inflation
and generally does so more the less anti-inflationary is wage/price-bargaining
organization. Thus, the evidence is unanimous that conservative monetary poli-
cymaking and beneficial bargaining organization are substitutes in nominal and
complements in real outcomes, at least in the low-to-moderately-high BC-range.
For substantive example, all the results would seem to agree on both the German
case and the likely effects of the move from Bundesbank-led German to ECB-led
European monetary policy. That move is from moderately high BC, led by traded
sectors, to relatively low BC of unknown, likely less, traded-sector leadership,
with CC remaining high. By any of these analyses, German institutional-structural
conditions effected relatively favorable long-run real-nominal tradeoffs, achieving
equilibrium low inflation at moderate real cost or even at some benefit. European
institutional-structural conditions promise much less favorable terms.
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VI. Conclusion
Important points of theoretical and empirical agreement have emerged. First,
even standard, classical approaches agree that CC’s nominal benefits depend on
labor/goods-market organization. Political-economic general equilibrium then suf-
fices to imply interactive real effects for CC. If governments enact real reform
partly to reduce inflation bias, then their incentives to do so depend on the bias size
and that depends, inter alia, on the degrees of CC, of BC, and their interaction.
Second, every model agrees that strategic bargainer interaction with monetary
authorities undermines the strong neutrality result of classic CBI theory. This is
a fortiori true if any private-actors are inflation averse (and if no one is, then
inflation is irrelevant). Moreover, all these approaches would agree with general
statements that strategic bargainer reactions to the expected character of monetary
policy shifts and reshapes the relation between BC and real outcomes. Such stra-
tegic non-neutralities arise because (a) another policymaker adjusts real policies to
the nature of monetary policy, or (b) more coordinated inflation-averse bargainers
moderate their wage demands more the less credibly conservative the monetary
authority, or (c) credibly conservative monetary policy affects real- and relative-
wage labor-demand elasticities differently, altering wage/price settlements in ways
that depend on bargaining organization, or (d) conservative monetary policy af-
fects differentiated bargainers differently, producing on-average real effects that
depend on the shares of bargainer types in the aggregate of settlements. Discord
regards the nature of this shifting and reshaping of Calmfors-Driffill curves in-
duced by strategic interactions (b)–(d) and stem primarily from assumptions about
real and relative wage (price) elasticities of labor (goods) demand, and how each
changes with wage/price bargaining institutional-structure. The empirical findings
also share core conclusions despite disagreeing disturbingly in some specifics. All
found that CC is generally non-neutral in ways that depend on its interaction with
BC and that the real effects of CC were more palatable at mid-to-high than at low-
to-mid BC, though disagreement surrounds the effect at very high BC and the sign
of CC’s non-neutrality over the range of BC more generally (see Figure 1).46
Notwithstanding the wide diversity in sources of non-neutralities and specific
disagreements in empirical and theoretical conclusions, the reviewed work has
surprisingly uniform implications for the likely impact of member-country del-
egation to a common, credibly conservative, ECB-led European monetary policy.
With the German (Swiss and Austrian) example(s), and with support of previ-
ous theory and evidence, the ECB’s framers clearly intended to endow it with
considerable conservatism and autonomy, expecting nominal benefits at little or
no equilibrium real costs. This emerging literature suggests, however, that post-
war Germany’s success in combining low inflation and unemployment derived,
not from the CC of the Bundesbank alone, but from its interaction with mid-to-
highly coordinated bargaining with dominant traded- and dominated public-sector
bargainers. European wage/price bargaining is instead characterized by smaller
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(relative to Europe), more numerous, and less coordinated bargaining units, though
still not even approaching perfect competition in most industries. Therefore, the
ECB’s autonomous conservatism is likely more costly (less beneficial) than the
Bundesbank’s had been in Germany.47 (Obviously, other considerations, such as
reduced exchange-rate uncertainty and other transaction costs, are also paramount.
The reviewed works make no claim that its emphasized effects dominate, indeed
the opposite could easily be true; rather, the work clarifies one set of previously
missed effects of delegation to an autonomous, conservative ECB.) Whether such
tradeoffs are acceptable depends on the relative value given real and nominal out-
comes, but tradeoffs do exist, in equilibrium, on average, and in the long run. Their
terms depend on the institutional (CC, BC) and sectoral (G/T, etc.) structure that
each member-country exchanges for Europe’s political-economic structure in del-
egating to the ECB. Moreover, within countries, those constituencies more hurt by
unemployment would tend to suffer while those more harmed by inflation would
generally gain. And these aggregate and distributional tradeoffs are likely to be
steeper for most polities than the popular historical examples suggest because the
institutional and sectoral structure of Europe would interact much less favorably
with the ECB than, for example, the institutional and sectoral structure of Germany
has with the Bundesbank in the past.
Notes
1. Conservative commitments also debar monetary stabilization, effective here given uncertainty
or incomplete information (e.g., Cukierman, 1992), yet the core conclusion remains that CBI
lowers inflation virtually costlessly, especially since evidence that CBI increases real variance is
lacking (e.g., Alesina and Summers, 1993).
2. The relationship may be non-linear (see Calmfors and Driffill, 1988).
3. Distinguishing monetary-policymaker autonomy from conservatism and wage/price-bargaining
unit concentration from coordination becomes important later.
4. Standard approaches build from Kydland and Prescott (1977), Bade and Parkin (1982), Barro
and Gordon (1983a, b), Rogoff (1985), Grilli et al. (1991), Cukierman (1992), Lohmann (1992),
Alesina and Summers (1993), Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
5. Ball and Romer (1990) show that small nominal rigidities, Lucas-Rapping (1969) sticky wages
or Mankiw (1985) menu costs, alone do not suffice to produce much real policy-effectiveness,
but small real and nominal rigidities do. Akerloff-Yellen (1985) near-rationality or calculation
costs, or bargaining power in labor/goods markets, would suffice.
6. Whether nominal and real rigidities stem from price-setting firms or wage-setting unions is
irrelevant; henceforth, the text adopts the more familiar wage-setting language.
7. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) review previous empirical studies, listing few with controls (to
which add Al-Marhubi and Willett, 1995; and Havrilesky and Granato, 1993) and no interactive
models.
8. Indeed, “incipient inflationary pressures” do not strictly exist in standard models since inflation
is just money-supply growth, which banks fully control. Furthermore, financial-stability motives
for counter-cyclical policy (see Cukierman, 1992, ch. 7) cannot explain the Fed’s justification
for its behavior even if they might explain the counter-cyclicality.
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9. The Fed rarely if ever mentions wage/price bargainers; examples of the Bundesbank’s very
different announcements are easily found: e.g., Kennedy (1991, 27–53); Financial Times
24/6/1993, 14.
10. Development follows Olson (1965), Headey (1970), Berger (1981), Lehmbruch and Schmitter
(1982), Cameron (1984), Lange (1984), Lange and Garrett (1985), Bruno and Sachs (1987),
Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Soskice (1990). Carlin and Soskice (1990) and Layard et al. (1991)
are textbook treatments; Calmfors (1993) provides an excellent review.
11. Bargains are often modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas with i’s most-preferred outcome that all ∼ i
exercise restraint, then all, then none, then only i. The ordering implicitly assumes considerable
market power since only i raising wages would be most preferred only if employment is very
wage inelastic. See below, Calmfors and Driffill (1988), Calmfors (1993).
12. The UK and Italy, e.g., scrambled briefly, mostly unsuccessfully, to institute CWB in their
economies (Regini, 1984).
13. See Swenson (1989), Soskice (1990), and Layard et al. (1991) on the former and Calmfors and
Driffill (1988), Layard et al. (1991), and Calmfors (1993) on the latter.
14. E.g., Soskice (1990) and Calmfors and Driffill (1988) dispute Japan and Switzerland.
15. Cf. Hall (1994), Garrett and Way (1995a, b), Iversen (1998a, b), Hall and Franzese (1998), and
Franzese (1999a).
16. One can exclude zero and full BC, though. Bargaining implies some market power and so non-
zero BC. Conversely, any international mobility in goods or labor precludes full coordination
among all bargainers since some are foreign.
17. Arguments in, e.g., Golden (1993), Thelen (1994), Golden and Wallerstein (1995), Lange et al.
(1995) suggest that union-membership structure will not suffice.
18. Curvature of relations between BC and restraint can be estimated directly (see, e.g., Iversen
(1998a, b)), or competition-reducing and internalization-increasing features of wage/price-
bargaining organization can be separated (see, e.g., Layard et al., 1991). Attempts at the latter
rely on union density to represent the former and BC indices the latter.
19. Scharpf’s (1984, 1987, 1991) work is exceptional (both senses) and partly foreshadowed the
syntheses reviewed here.
20. (a) Bleaney (1996), Forteza (1998), Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen (1999), and those re-
viewed below, and (b) Jonsson (1995), Simmons (1996), Clark et al. (1998), Oatley (1999), Way
(2000) more thoroughly explore a subset of the implied interactions, regarding CBA interactions
(a) with BC and (b) with government-partisanship and/or the electoral cycle.
21. ScaleCBA to 0 ≡ full dependence, 1 ≡ full autonomy. Lohmann (1992) shows that, for similarly
scaled costs of replacing bankers, r , equilibrium policy is r ·C + (1 − r) ·G, where C is banks’
and G governments’ desired policy, but she does not emphasize this result. Jonsson (1995) and
Bleaney (1996) posit (1)’s first line but also ignore its general implications.
22. Bleaney (1996), Forteza (1998), Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen (1999) analyze nominal
effects of strategic interaction directly. Work reviewed below analyzes nominal and real effects
of such interactions, so further discussion is deferred.
23. See De Haan (1999) and Berger et al. (1999) for reviews of these political-economic general-
equilibrium approaches.
24. The text follows the simpler 1998 model; the 1999 article derives similar results in a Blanchard-
Fisher (1989, p. 433) model: “Equilibrium output is neutral with respect to . . . nominal scale
[but with strategic bargainers] . . . non-neutral with respect to degrees of accommodation in the
monetary rule” (Soskice and Iversen, 1999).
25. Conversely, of course, n has real effects that depend on β.
26. Similar concerns may apply to the exogeneity of α.
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27. Constant returns to scale also differentiate the approach from some others. Another problematic,
technical issue is that, at union weight on real wages α = β/(N − 1), employment is undefined,
and wages are 0. As α approaches β/(N − 1) from below, e∗ goes to ∞; as it approaches from
above e∗ goes to −∞ (from 0 at α = ∞).
28. A thorough review would include Yashiv (1989), Cubitt (1989, 1992, 1995), Agell and Ysander
(1993), Gylfason and Lindbeck (1994), Grüner and Hefeker (1997), Jensen (1997), Skott (1997),
Zervoyianni (1997).
29. If not, then inflation is irrelevant. Benevolent planners also combine private-actor utilities,
usually with equal weights.
30. Rama (1994), Grüner and Hefeker (1997), Zervoyianni (1997), and Franzese (1999a) emphasize
this justification.
31. The authors note that standard CBI models are simpler even than this since output is at least
endogenous here.
32. (10) W = w2 + w1M where w2 ≡ 2ω
T
u−2uYTu +2qPTU
1+u+q and w1 ≡ 1+u+q1+u+q , and (11) M =
m2 + m1W where m2 ≡ 2Y
T
g +2vP tg
1+v and m1 ≡ 1−v1+v , where v is government weight on prices
relative to output, and u, q are union weight on output and prices relative to real wages.
33. Cubbitt (1992) considers games where union, government, both, or neither can pre-commit to
M orW : Stackelberg Government-Leads, Stackelberg Union-Leads, and Nash with and without
pre-commitment. Results differ with who leads; interestingly, government may prefer to fol-
low. Cubbitt (1995) explores three aspects of corporatism other than centralization: greater
union-weight on inflation, higher union aggregate-output target, greater alignment of union and
government output-targets, and cooperative union-government play. The results can be derived
from the above.
34. Soskice and Iversen (1998), Hall and Franzese (1998), and Franzese (1999a) concur.
35. Cukierman–Lippi and Soskice–Iversen both assume α and γ exogenous and independent of n.
36. Franzese (1999a), however, is only a heuristic model, and Iversen (1998a, b) has implicit dif-
ferential money illusion among different wage-bargainers or requires further assumptions (see
below). Hall (1994), Franzese (1996), Hall and Franzese (1998), Franzese and Hall (1999) make
some of the same points as Franzese (1999a), less formally still.
37. More completely, CC interacts best (worst) with small traded (public) sectors leading large
public (traded) sectors in coordinated bargaining, with non-traded sectors intermediate. Public-
sector-led coordinated bargaining can under-perform non-coordinated bargaining intrinsically
and in its interaction with monetary conservatism.
38. A similar coordination-enforcement mechanism operates in Soskice and Iversen (1998, 1999)
and Franzese (1999a).
39. Such complicated contracts may be difficult to write at high levels of aggregation, for example.
40. The model also laid foundations for Soskice and Iversen (1998, 1999), and it is more fully-
specified than Franzese (1999a).
41. Except as noted, in this section BC refers to some bargaining-coordination index, and CC to
some index of “central bank independence” summarizing both autonomy and conservatism of
the monetary authority.
42. Henceforth decade refers to Cukierman’s (1992) periodization of LVAU – the most frequently
measured index available: 1950–9, 1960–72, 1973–9, 1980–9.
43. Examining the Cukierman–Lippi row of Figure 1 carefully, one sees that such results could
emerge if CC/mid-to-high-BC interactions confer some benefit that their model misses. Iversen
(1998a, b), Franzese (1994, 1996, 1999a), and Soskice and Iversen (1998, 1999) all suggest such
a possibility, namely that higher CC may help enforce coordination on restrained settlements in
non-centralized systems of “pattern-setting” coordinated bargaining.
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44. Iversen (1998a, b) uses actual exchange-rate movements in addition to an average of standard
CBI indices.
45. Notably regarding Japan and Switzerland, over which Soskice (1990) and Calmfors and Driffill
(1988) also dispute. However, his sensitivity analysis leans against that being the sole source of
the different findings.
46. Since this writing, several additional models of these interactions have come to the author’s
attention. Notably, Adolph (2001) adds a strategic partisan government to Iversen’s model,
which induces CC-BC-interaction contingent partisan effects, and Holden (2001) endogenizes
bargaining organization to the monetary stance, inducing quite different interactions than some
of those considered here.
47. Hall (1994) and Hall and Franzese (1998) elaborate a similar argument. Soskice and Iversen
(1998a, b) emphasize that Europe could evolve a pattern-setting system of bargaining, which
would be more beneficial, and Franzese (1999a) would imply that traded-sector bargainers would
be best to set such patterns.
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